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When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

Zack Twamley

WDF examines how wars broke out, how they were concluded, and their consequences. Expect juicy diplomacy, sneaky intrigue, fascinating characters, and incredible drama. By Dr Zack Twamley, qualified history nerd.


Current Series: The July Crisis

Patreon Series: The Age of Bismarck

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#30: 27 July 1914 I - Britain Tries Diplomacy
Hace 6 días
#30: 27 July 1914 I - Britain Tries Diplomacy
In this enormous episode, we examine the largely forgotten story of British efforts to resolve the crisis, and efforts at home to prepare the people for what might come next.Although Austria's ultimatum had expired two days before, there was still room for diplomacy to work, and Sir Edward Grey was determined to give it his best shot. To preserve peace, Grey pressed his conference scheme to the European courts. When this was rejected, he modified his approach, and accepted other suggestions like bilateral Austro-Russian negotiations. Telegrams pinged back to London, reporting on the deteriorating situation, yet Grey held firm to the principle that Britain should not declare itself. She had more leverage, he believed, if she maintained her 'free hand.'In his very short address to the Commons, Grey alluded to the conference scheme, and stressed the government's commitment to peace, as well as its freedom of action. Yet, he did not reject claims made by The Times and other papers, which emphasised Britain's ties to its friends, and the duty this entailed. He also remained quiet about the elephant in the room - Britain was tied to France, and military discussions between them had secretly bound Britain to French war calculations. This Grey wisely kept quiet from the Cabinet, as a split was inevitable if he did not tread lightly.This is exactly the kind of deep dive analysis which this podcast is all about, and I can only thank you so much for making it possible!Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#29: 26 July 1914 II - Better an End in Horror
23-09-2024
#29: 26 July 1914 II - Better an End in Horror
If Austria-Hungary wanted the war with Serbia, it would have to get its skates on. Europe was eagerly looking for any sign of a way out, even if Austria was not.The British were central in pressing the need for mediation, but they knew that Germany's inclusion was key if it was to work. The Germans, it was reported, anticipated British neutrality. This was wrong, it was insisted, because Britain would tend to her interests. Even more, Britain had kept its fleet, mobilised through annual manoeuvres, intact as the crisis escalated. Did this not prove Britain's seriousness?Whether Britain was sincere or not, it mattered less than what Austria did. By now it was widely known that Austrian armies were not marching, and if the rumours were true, and she could not march until 12 August, then that gave plenty of time for things to blow over. But before Sir Edward Grey could put the finishing touches on another Balkan conference, he first had to ensure German support, and this was proving impossible to obtain.The German imperative of supporting Vienna in its swift Serbian war remained in play, even if Austria had not moved. Mediation would threaten this goal, and it had to be countered. Besides, reports from Russia were beginning to make Berlin nervous. Increased military preparations could ruin Germany's own strategic plans, so more information was vital. Just then it was learned that the Kaiser and his Chancellor were returning to Berlin.Could they persuade Austria to move? If not, could they persuade her statesmen to participate in diplomatic efforts? Berlin did not want a conference, but neither she nor Austria wanted war with Russia either. Could Russia not stay in her lane and ignore the attack on Serbia, especially after all the Serbs had done? The fatalist Austrian view asserted that whatever the consequences, Serbia had to be destroyed. It might be disastrous for the Habsburgs, but as the saying went, it was better to endure an end in horror, than a horror without end. Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#28: 26 July 1914 I - Austria Delays Again
16-09-2024
#28: 26 July 1914 I - Austria Delays Again
The ultimatum had expired, and yet somehow, Austria had not declared war on Serbia. What was going on?Well, despite pushing the crisis forward with reckless abandon, the Austrian chief of staff Conrad von Hotzendorff now seemed awake to the dangers facing the country. The army would not be ready for war until 12 August, he said. This was a shock to the Germans, who continued to expect a lightning Austrian strike at Belgrade. But it did give the diplomats time to do their work.From Britain, Sir Edward Grey believed a mediation scheme involving four uninvolved powers was the answer. He encouraged Berlin to push this idea, and the Germans did so, but only reluctantly, and out of fear of offending Britain if they did not. But the question of Russia was arguably the most important of all, and the Tsar was apparently now willing to exercise his military muscle by approving the period preparatory to war, and the mobilisation of key military districts.This should have shown Austria that Russian intervention was highly likely, yet her statesmen continued to forge ahead. They had lost the diplomatic initiative, and they had failed to present Europe with a fait accompli. Instead, the sluggish, conditional Austrian response seemed ideally suited to diplomatic mediation. But would Austria take the easy way out? Incredibly, from Vienna, the answer was still no.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#27: 25 July 1914 II - Russian to Mobilise
09-09-2024
#27: 25 July 1914 II - Russian to Mobilise
Here we address the question - now that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had expired, and the Austrians had evacuated Belgrade, what was Russia going to do about it?The answer is as complicated as it is controversial. Russia's response revolved around military preparations; specifically, those preparations which would make the mobilisation of its enormous army across such a vast empire easier to carry out. These measures were called the Period Preparatory to War, and on this day, these measures were officially approved by the Tsar and his Ministers. What did this mean? Was the Period Preparatory to War simply mobilisation under a different name, or was it a reasonable response to the crisis, which merely granted Russia more diplomatic leeway?Unsurprisingly, the answer is contentious. To some, this was the key aggravating factor which transformed the July Crisis from a regional dispute into the world war it became. To others, Russia's preparations may have been inflammatory, but they were not necessarily sinister. Should we take these measures as proof of Russia's intention to orchestrate a world war on favourable terms to themselves? Perhaps we should not go so far, but one thing is certain, by the end of the day, a line had been crossed in St Petersburg.Once more details leaked out, Austria and Germany were bound to take notice. The question then became - would the Central Powers be scared off, or would they up the ante, seeing in Russia's behaviour yet another bluff which had to be called? Could anyone stop this game of chicken? In fact the Russians were not the only actors willing to be economical with the truth. Another was the French ambassador, Paleologue, and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, as well as many German officials, determined to have their localised war and firm in the belief that Russia would back down.In this episode, we wade through this soup of contradictions, poor communications, mistrust and misinformation, to arrive at some worrying conclusions. Whoever we might claim was responsible, Europe was entering the twilight period of peace, whether contemporaries wished to acknowledge it or not.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#26: 25 July 1914 I - The Last Chance for Peace?
02-09-2024
#26: 25 July 1914 I - The Last Chance for Peace?
By now, everyone was expecting Austria-Hungary to do something once its ultimatum expired later in the day, but what? And could this response be adjusted, and peace be preserved, if only a certain diplomatic finesse was applied?In Britain, Sir Edward Grey certainly hoped so. The solution, to him, seemed one of mediation, where the four uninvolved powers - Britain, France, Germany and Italy - gathered to arbitrate the Austro-Serb dispute. The question then became, could Germany be brought on side? Many were doubtful. It did not help that the German claim it had known nothing of the ultimatum was highly suspicious. Was it truly believable that Austria had acted entirely alone? This question informed the responses. In Russia, Sergei Sazonov continued to lead a firmer and more assertive foreign policy, but to what end? As he learned of the British mediation plans, Sazonov did not rule them out, but he also failed to mention that Russia's preliminary military measures were already underway. It was understood that mobilisation was a dangerous risk, which would complicate mediation efforts. The further these measures had gone by the time mediation got its chance, the harder it would be to save the peace. This was why an extension of Austria's 48 hour deadline became briefly popular - this would give everyone sufficient time to act. Unsurprisingly, Vienna opposed this measure, and it scarcely got off the ground before time had run out, and Serbia handed over its reply. Contrary to contemporary views and the opinions of historians since, the Serbian reply was not designed to placate Austria. It was instead designed to engender sympathy among the Entente. There was no defiant language or accusations, but Belgrade's response did reject core Austrian demands, and denied that they Vienna possessed sufficient evidence to prosecute its case. As the Austrians fully appreciated, the ultimatum was always designed to be unacceptable, but Serbia's 'perfumed' response, rather than a full throated message of defiance, greatly complicated the situation. Indeed, it was one among many complications of the day, as the glacial pace of Austrian policymaking encountered yet more roadblocks. All the while, in the east, Russian soldiers were marching to their destinations. If there was a chance for peace, then this was surely the last chance. Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#25: 24 July 1914 - 'It Is War This Time!'
26-08-2024
#25: 24 July 1914 - 'It Is War This Time!'
We return to our narrative on an eventful day in world history. By the end of 24 July, Russia had established its policy towards Austria's ultimatum. But what was this policy, and why did Russia act so differently to crises in the past?We find Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to be central to the events that transpired next. But what did Sazonov want? He authorised the period preparatory to war, and signalled his intention to support Serbia via war, if it came to that. This did not mean Sazonov was a warmonger, but he had not been entirely honest with the Central Powers either. Moderate advice was given to Serbia, and the Austrian and German ambassadors were informed that Russia would not look lightly upon an Austrian attack. Seeing German tentacles curling around any Austrian initiative, Sazonov felt he could not back down if Russia wished to retain her prestige, but what did this mean in practice?Further afield, Britain was perhaps the sole power capable of offering a neutral space where mediation could take place. But how attractive were Grey's proposals, and were they likely to appeal to Germany? Did British distractions with the Irish Home Rule crisis impact its effectiveness in this regard? It seemed unlikely that London could rely on France. This time around, the French, represented in St Petersburg by Paleologue, maintained that Russia would find its ally loyally by its side for whatever came next. Such assurances were not designed to pull Russia back, because the prevailing belief in Entente circles was that only a policy of firmness could deter the Central Powers from going further.However, if all the powers clung to a policy of deterrence, and if none considered backing down, what we are left with is a dangerous game of chicken with no off ramps. Since Sazonov believed that it meant war this time, was this proof of his conspiratorial policy, or simply of his realism? Could the Central Powers have done anything to defuse the crisis, or had the assumption of Russia's retreat blinded them to the disaster they now hurtled towards? All these questions and many more will be addressed in the episodes to come, so I hope you enjoy it! Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#24: 1912-1914 - Anglo-German Relations III
21-08-2024
#24: 1912-1914 - Anglo-German Relations III
By late 1912, it appeared the period of Anglo-German detente was over. The Kaiser assembled a War Council, and apparently planned for a war of domination. In fact, appearances were deceptive, and although Britain and Germany's relationship had been damaged, it was still intact. There now emerged a new opportunity to repair it, as the Balkan Wars brought the two disinterested powers together again.The two powers had already achieved a great deal by pushing the naval race to the side. But other questions were more difficult. Both France and Germany came to terms with the role of Belgium in their war plans, but only Germany viewed its violation as a necessity. This key aspect of German strategy was already locked in, but this proved a grave miscalculation. That said, opinions in Berlin had arrived at more optimistic conclusions by 1914. Britain, it was said, faced an internal crisis over Ireland, and those intractable problems meant opportunities for the Central Powers.Yet still, the Anglo-German detente continued, with fascinating trends emerging in the British Foreign Office. For so long dominated by anti-German sentiment and fear of Russia, a new generation of officials were graduating to new positions, and they were less sanguine about the Anglo-Russian relationship. A last minute trip by Grey's private secretary to Berlin suggested a new era of cooperation, but this, like so many other plans, fell to pieces once the Archduke fell in Sarajevo. Here we conclude the story of this underrated relationship, and set the scene for what was to come.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#23: 1911-1912 - Anglo-German Relations II
19-08-2024
#23: 1911-1912 - Anglo-German Relations II
By late 1911, Germany had been embarrassed by the Second Moroccan Crisis, and the Anglo-French Entente had once again rallied. We might have expected Germany to double down on its provocative naval campaign, to increase the pressure on Britain. In fact, what happened instead was the beginning of a period of Anglo-German detente. This was initiated through the Haldane Mission of spring 1912, which sought to exchange restrictions on naval building with political guarantees.The mission was not a success, but it did terrify the French, who worked to consolidate their agreements with Britain on the seas, with dramatic consequences. In this tug of war for Britain's friendship, though, her officials were far less free than they may have assumed. A strong current of anti-German sentiment had become entrenched in London, and it would take braver steps to reserve this trend. Could they do so, and snatch peace from the jaws of conflict? Join me here as we continue our look at Anglo-German relations on the eve of war.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#22: 1905-1911 - Anglo-German Relations I
16-08-2024
#22: 1905-1911 - Anglo-German Relations I
Everyone knows the story of Britain and Germany before 1914. Or at least, they think they do.Anglo-German relations following the Russo-Japanese War seemed bound to enter a period of hostility, enabled by the naval race which forced London to invest heavily in production and innovation, and produced the dreadnought as an unforeseen consequence. But this race to outbuild the other in warship construction did not lead automatically to the events of 1914. Indeed, many possibilities existed for the two rivals to patch things up.This was what the French truly feared, but as they prepared for a second showdown with Berlin in Morocco, the British appeared to stand by them. Was the British Cabinet entirely convinced that Germany was its enemy? Many thought so, but again, matters were not so clear cut. Even Kaiser Wilhelm's disastrous record in PR could not guarantee that these two nations, tied together by so many dynastic, religious, traditional and economic threads, would face each other on opposite sides of the battlefield.In this first part of our trilogy looking at Anglo-German relations, we set the scene and assess some key moments when Germany became the bogeyman of Britain. Yet even as the naval race became a naval scare, and even as Britain secretly planned for an Anglo-French defence, nothing was yet set in stone. The years that immediately preceded the war were vital for the next phase in the relationship - detente.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#16: March-June 1914 - The Entente Part 3
02-08-2024
#16: March-June 1914 - The Entente Part 3
In our final episode looking at the Entente, we bring our story up to the eve of the July Crisis.How had past lessons influenced the way Russia and France interpreted the world by spring 1914? Was war certain? Had new military reforms so affected the balance of power that war was now inevitable? What did the position of Britain mean for the two allies, and why was London so concerned with losing Russia as a friend? Was Germany's effort to match its rivals really sustainable in the long term?The British strategy of balancing between the two blocs was coming to an end, but how would the Germans react to news that Russia was now courting Britain into the Entente? Was Britain truly as free as she imagined, or was the cold reality of the bloc system about to dawn in London? Still, few contemporaries believed war would come - had the peacemakers not saved Europe from war in the past? Perhaps they had, but there was no guarantee that a spark in a sensitive region would not transform the situation.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#15: Jan-March 1914 - The Entente Part 2
31-07-2024
#15: Jan-March 1914 - The Entente Part 2
In our second installment of this Entente analysis, we look at the Liman von Sanders crisis.By late 1913, a new crisis in Russo-German relations centred on the status of General Liman von Sanders, appointed to command the 1st Army Corps at Constantinople. To the Germans, this was a useful way to assert their influence in the Ottoman Empire and rebuild its capabilities after several years of conflict. But to Russia, the appearance of their rival in a theatre earmarked as a sphere of Russian interest seemed akin to a threat. How would Sergei Sazonov react, and did the resolution of the crisis settle differences, or merely establish resentments and mistrust which reverberated right up to the outbreak of the First World War? Please join us, as we examine this forgotten crisis, assess the growing military power of Russia, its relationship with France, and the possibility that Britain might tie itself more securely to its former rivals. The Entente had come a long way, yet it was far from set in stone...Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#14: 1912-1913 - The Entente Part 1
29-07-2024
#14: 1912-1913 - The Entente Part 1
In this first of three episodes, we look at the pre-war position of the Entente!Before we bring our narrative further, it would be useful to turn our attention to what came before. The Franco-Russian alliance was formed in 1894, and over the next twenty years, the two allies experienced their share of ups and downs. Even as new crises shifted the balance of power, France and Russia stuck together. Russia brought the manpower, and France brought the money and expertise which could project that power. By 1912, certain limits had been set on the alliance, depending on the theatre in question, but Raymond Poincare, Premier and then President of France before the war, worked to remove these breaks, and enhance the alliance. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov distinguished himself. After several ignominious retreats on the world stage, both partners were looking for opportunities to stand firm, and show the Triple Alliance they meant business. The inclusion of Britain might affirm the supremacy of the Entente, but first, Russia would have to secure its influence in the Straits.Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:Do you want ad-free episodes with scripts attached, and bonus content? Support us on Patreon and you can suggest July Crisis episodes!Join our Facebook group as we make our way through this fascinating series!Click here to see our July Crisis workspace in Perlego, you'll find every source you need! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.